Evaluating self-reflection and insight as self-conscious traits. by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro et al.
 Evaluating self-reflection and insight as self-conscious traits.
By: Paul J. Silvia & Ann G. Phillips 
Paul J. Silvia & Ann G. Phillips (2011). Evaluating self-reflection and insight as self-conscious 
traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(2), 234–237. 
Made available courtesy of Elsevier: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886910004782 
***Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written 
permission from Elsevier. This version of the document is not the version of record. Figures 
and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the document. *** 
Abstract: 
Recent years have seen several new models of individual-differences in self-consciousness. The 
present research evaluated self-reflection and insight as types of self-focused attention. In the 
self-reflection and insight model, both traits represent metacognitive individual differences that 
aid self-regulation. In a sample of 233 young adults, both self-reflection and insight covaried 
with many different self-conscious traits (public and private self-consciousness, rumination, 
reflection), which suggests that they crosscut past typologies. Insight, but not self-reflection, 
covaried with many markers of affect and well-being: people high in insight had lower 
depression and anxiety symptoms, lower NA, higher PA, and higher self-esteem. On the whole, 
the evidence is consistent with the self-reflection and insight model, and the findings suggest that 
self-reflection and insight are distinct from each other and from other self-conscious traits. 
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The capacity to reflect on one’s thoughts, emotions, and actions is central to self-regulation, self-
evaluation, and self-criticism (Carver, 2003 and Duval and Silvia, 2001). Social and personality 
psychology thus have a long interest in the causes and consequences of self-reflection. This large 
literature sorts into studies that manipulate self-awareness (see Silvia & Duval, 2001a) and 
studies that examine individual-differences relevant to self-awareness. Early on, research began 
referring to situational variation as self-awareness and dispositional variation as self-
consciousness (e.g., Buss, 1980). The experimental self-awareness tradition evoked self-
reflection by directing people’s attention to themselves, usually by showing people their images 
with mirrors (e.g., Phillips & Silvia, 2005) and video cameras (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2008 and 
Silvia and Duval, 2001b) or by making people feel novel and distinctive ( Silvia and Eichstaedt, 
2004 and Snow et al., 2004). In contrast, the dispositional self-consciousness tradition primarily 
used self-report scales to assess stable variability in tendencies to self-reflect. 
The study of individual-differences dates back to the model of private and public self-
consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), which assumed that people differed in their 
tendency to reflect on public or private aspects of the self (see Smári, Ólason, & Ólafsson, 2008, 
for a review). Many studies have criticized the psychometric qualities of the original scales, 
suggesting that the private self-consciousness scale should be split into two subfactors (Anderson 
et al., 1996, Ben-Artzi, 2003, Chang, 1998, Creed and Funder, 1998 and Ruipérez and Belloch, 
2003). One subfactor, known as self-reflection, reflects a maladaptive self-consciousness; the 
other, known as internal-state awareness, reflects an adaptive self-consciousness. This proposal 
remains controversial. First, few firm conclusions can be drawn from ad hoc 4-item scales with 
low internal consistencies ( Bernstein et al., 1986, Britt, 1992 and Silvia, 1999). Second, large-
sample confirmatory analyses of the private self-consciousness scale disagree over whether a one 
or two factor solution is superior. Some studies find that two factors are superior (Cramer, 2000); 
others find that both one and two-factors models fit poorly (e.g., Nystedt & Ljungberg, 2002). 
Finally, it is unclear if the subscales are conceptually meaningful (see Bissonnette and Bernstein, 
1990, Silvia, 1999 and Wicklund, 1990). 
 
Because of the thorny issues with private self-consciousness, several groups of researchers have 
developed new models of dispositional self-consciousness and new self-report scales (McKenzie 
and Hoyle, 2008 and Trapnell and Campbell, 1999). One of these new models posits two 
components to dispositional self-consciousness: self-reflection and insight (Grant, Franklin, & 
Langford, 2002). These traits are measured with the self-reflection and insight scale (Grant et al., 
2002), a 20-item self-report scale. Self-reflection refers to “the inspection and evaluation of 
one’s thoughts, feelings and behavior” (Grant et al., 2002, p. 821), whereas insight refers to “the 
clarity of understanding of one’s thoughts, feelings and behavior” (p. 821). Both are viewed as 
metacognitive traits that are central to self-regulation, but they differ in whether they are 
primarily evaluative (self-reflection) vs. mindful (insight). Both exploratory (Grant et al., 2002) 
and confirmatory (Roberts & Stark, 2008) factor analyses have provided support for the factor 
structure. 
 
The present research sought to evaluate the distinction between self-reflection and insight as 
assessed by Grant et al.’s (2002) self-reflection and insight scale. First, little is known about how 
self-reflection and insight relate to other measures of self-consciousness. The scales were 
developed in response to deficiencies in the original private self-consciousness scale, but their 
relations with private self-consciousness and other self-conscious traits have not received much 
attention apart from one study (Grant et al., 2002, Study 3) that correlated the scales with private 
self-consciousness. Furthermore, their relations with other individual differences – such as 
Trapnell and Campbell’s (1999) measures of rumination and reflection – have not yet been 
examined. One goal of the present work was thus to explore how self-reflection and insight 
covaried with prior models of individual differences related to self-consciousness. 
 
Second, we sought to expand the nomological net of self-reflection and insight by assessing their 
relationships with a range of affective and self-evaluative traits. Grant’s (Grant, 2001, Grant, 
2003 and Grant et al., 2002) writings about self-reflection and insight suggest that self-reflection 
and insight should have diverging relations with markers of emotional well-being, and recent 
work (Lyke, 2009) suggests that this is the case. Lyke (2009) found that insight positively 
covaried with several markers of well-being, whereas self-reflection did not. To expand upon 
past work, we emphasized markers of poor functioning, such as anxiety and depression 
symptoms. Much of the interest in self-reflection and insight comes from clinical, counseling, 
and coaching domains, particularly areas interested in how introspective abilities may aid or 
hinder change (e.g., Grant, 2003 and Sauter et al., 2010), so it is worth examining how these 




A total of 223 undergraduate students – 162 women, 61 men – volunteered to participate and 
received credit toward a research option in a psychology class. The racial and ethnic composition 
of the sample was approximately 68% Caucasian, 18% African–American, 3% Asian, and 2% 
Hispanic, with the remainder declining to provide self-reported racial and ethnic information. 
95% of the sample spoke English as a native language. 
 
2.2. Procedure 
People completed a battery of questionnaires in large group sessions. The following measures 
were included. 
 
2.2.1. Measures of self-conscious traits 
The self-reflection and insight scale (Grant et al., 2002) is a 20-item self-report scale that 
assesses two factors. The self-reflection factor has 12 items that assess a tendency to think about 
and evaluate thoughts, actions, and feelings; examples include “I frequently examine my 
feelings” and “It is important for me to evaluate the things that I do”. This factor has two highly-
correlated facets – need for self-reflection and engagement in self-reflection. The insight factor 
has eight items that assess the clarity of experience and self-knowledge; examples include “I 
usually know why I feel the way I do” and “I’m usually aware of my thoughts.” The items were 
completed on 7-point scales (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
 
The 24-item Rumination–Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) measures two 
motives for self-focused attention: rumination (12 items) is “self-attentiveness motivated by 
perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self”; reflection (12 items) is “self-attentiveness 
motivated by curiosity or epistemic interest in the self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999, p. 297). 
Public self-consciousness (seven items) and private self-consciousness (10 items) were measured 
with the self-consciousness scales (Fenigstein et al., 1975). All item were completed on 7-point 
scales (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly Agree). 
 
2.2.2. Measures of emotion and self-evaluation 
To assess aspects of trait affectivity, we administered the revised Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 
1988), and the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CESD; Radloff, 1977), all 
of which are widely-used measures of depression and anxiety symptoms that offer relatively 
sharp discriminations between depression and anxiety (Beuke, Fischer, & McDowall, 2003). We 
additionally administered the trait version of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which yields positive affect (PA) and negative 
affect (NA) scores, and the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale, a common measure of global 
self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). 
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Data reduction and descriptive statistics 
Analyses were conducted with Mplus 6 using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors; 
standardized coefficients are reported. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and correlations. 
All of the scales had strong internal consistency except for private self-consciousness, which has 
been commonly found in past research (e.g., Smári et al., 2008). Notably, self-reflection and 
insight were essentially unrelated, r = −.075. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
Variable M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Self-
reflection 
4.62 .98 .878 1            
2. Insight 4.68 .95 .793 −.075 1           
3. Private 
SC 
4.51 .72 .589 .652 −.198 1          
4. Public 
SC 
4.58 .98 .707 .247 −.329 .490 1         
5. 
Rumination 
4.30 1.14 .898 .468 −.381 .569 .503 1        
6. 
Reflection 
4.04 1.06 .879 .673 −.072 .492 .170 .350 1       
7. BDI 7.45 7.27 .899 .147 −.378 .217 .250 .451 .159 1      
8. BAI 9.38 9.59 .928 .182 −.354 .248 .303 .403 .112 .585 1     
9. CSED 1.75 .47 .884 .103 −.383 .237 .247 .344 .132 .694 .536 1    
10. PA 3.50 .54 .788 .026 .230 −.035 −.061 −.218 −.059 −.448 −.272 −.333 1   
11. NA 2.15 .72 .870 .138 −.356 .238 .251 .365 .058 .539 .520 .657 −.209 1  
12. Self-
esteem 
5.52 1.10 .897 −.132 .447 −.262 −.336 −.477 −.173 −.702 −.553 −.610 .481 −.578 1 
Note: sample n = 223. α = Cronbach’s alpha. 
3.2. Predicting self-conscious traits 
How do self-reflection and insight relate to other self-conscious traits? We estimated a 
multivariate regression model that had two predictors – self-reflection and insight – and four 
outcomes: public and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) as well as rumination 
and reflection (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). This multivariate model allows us to model the 
influence of the predictors in light of the covariance of the outcomes. 
Self-reflection had significant positive relationships with private self-consciousness (
β = .64, p < .001), public self-consciousness (β = .22, p = .003), rumination (
β = .44, p < .001), and reflection (β = .67, p < .001). Insight, in contrast, had significant (but 
smaller) negative relationships with private self-consciousness (β = −.15, p = .009), public self-
consciousness (β = −.31, p < .001), and rumination (β = −.35, p < .001); insight did not 
significantly predict reflection (β = −.02, p = .67). The model R2 values were 44.2% for private 
self-consciousness, 15.8% for public self-consciousness, 33.9% for rumination, and 45.4% for 
reflection. 
3.3. Predicting affective traits 
A second multivariate regression model examined how self-reflection and insight predicted 
affective and self-evaluative traits. Self-reflection and insight were predictors, and BDI, BAI, 
CESD, PA, NA, and self-esteem scores were the outcomes. This model indicated that self-
reflection and insight had diverging effects on these outcomes. Overall, self-reflection had small 
positive effects on markers of negative affectivity: it significantly predicted BDI scores (
β = .12, marginal at p = .054), BAI scores (β = .16, p = .005), and NA (β = .12, marginal 
at p = .054); it did not significantly predict CESD scores (β = .07, p = .216), PA (
β = .04,p = .543), or self-esteem (β = −.09, p = .10). Insight, in contrast, generally had larger 
effects in the other direction. Higher insight predicted lower BDI (β = −.37, p < .001), BAI (
β = −.34, p < .001), and CESD (β = −.38, p < .001) scores, higher PA (β = .24, p < .001), 
lower NA (β = −.35, p < .001), and higher self-esteem (β = .44, p < .001). The model R2 values 
were 15.7% for BDI scores, 15.0% for BAI scores, 15.2% for the CESD, 5.6% for PA, 13.9% for 
NA, and 20.9% for self-esteem. 
3.4. Discussion 
The present research found supportive evidence for the self-reflection and insight model, an 
emerging perspective on individual differences in self-focused attention (Grant, 2003, Grant et 
al., 2002 and Lyke, 2009). First, self-reflection and insight were essentially uncorrelated, which 
is consistent with past research and with the model’s view of the traits as distinct kinds of 
metacognitive awareness. Second, both self-reflection and insight broadly predicted several 
different kinds of self-conscious traits; the effects were stronger for self-reflection. These broad 
relationships appeared despite the fact that the four outcome traits – private self-consciousness, 
public self-consciousness, rumination, and reflection – represent diverse kinds of individual 
differences. As a result, the distinction between self-reflection and insight seems different from 
the distinction between public and private self-consciousness and the distinction between 
rumination and reflection. 
 
Finally, the findings offer support for Grant et al.’s (2002) conception of self-reflection and 
insight. Insight significantly predicted a broad range of markers of affect and self-evaluation: 
people high in insight had better functioning on these measures. Self-reflection’s effects were in 
the other direction but were generally small. This pattern indicates that the self-reflection and 
insight scales are not merely “maladaptive vs. adaptive” kinds of self-focused attention, and it 
suggests that the scales are not simply measuring negative rumination and self-criticism. 
Moreover, these effects extend recent work by Lyke (2009), who found that insight, but not self-
reflection, significantly predicted markers of positive well-being. 
 
Future work should examine the attentional aspects of self-reflection and insight. Many studies 
found that private self-consciousness predicted implicit measures of self-directed thought, such 
as recognizing self-relevant words more quickly (Eichstaedt & Silvia, 2003) and using first-
person singular pronouns to complete ambiguous sentences (Carver & Scheier, 1978). Despite 
the scale’s shortcomings, it did capture individual differences in self-focused attention. Other 
scales, such as the rumination and reflection scales (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), seem not to 
capture self-focused attention because they do not covary with measures of self-focus (Silvia, 
Eichstaedt, & Phillips, 2005). Given the success of the self-reflection and insight scales in the 
present work and other recent research (Lyke, 2009 and Roberts and Stark, 2008), it is worth 
examining the attentional underpinnings of the constructs using cognitive and implicit methods. 
 
One reason for the emerging interest in the self-reflection and insight scales is their potential 
value in applied practice, particularly contexts in which introspective traits and abilities could 
predict the likelihood of success or difficulties. Grant (2003), for example, has examined how 
coaching influences self-reflection and insight, and other researchers have considered the traits’ 
relevance for readiness for professional development (Roberts & Stark, 2008) and for adolescent 
populations (Sauter et al., 2010). This applied interest is not surprising in light of the large 
literature on the clinical relevance of self-conscious traits, particularly private self-consciousness 
(Ingram, 1990). Although the present findings have no direct implications for applied and 
clinical practice, they do add to the body of work supporting the validity and value of the 
measure, and they should encourage future work interested in applied aspects of introspective 
abilities. At the same time, it is worth pointing out that the present findings are based on a cross-
sectional study, so causal, longitudinal, and lifespan aspects of self-reflection and insight await 
future work. Moreover, the sample consisted almost entirely of young adults who were early in 
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